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 [伪原创]者名经济学家的一封信：我看中国， |
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八袋长老
[博客]
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头衔: 海归中将
声望: 院士
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加入时间: 2005/02/03
文章: 6961
来自: 大陆到小陆
海归分: 601515
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作者：八袋长老 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
Dear 八袋  ,
Thank you for attending my presentation at SMU during my recent visit to Singapore. I enjoyed the dialogue we shared.
Our people travel to the region quite often now as we continue to expand and build out our Asia operations. I look forward to continuing to build the relationships we are establishing in Singapore and returning to the Lion City in the near future.
I recently provided our clients with an analysis regarding the China growth model which I am providing below. I hope you find this both compelling and insightful. If this type of research is of interest to you or the firm you represent, please do not hesitate to contact us to learn more about all of RGE’s products and services.
Thank you again.
Sincerely yours,
Nouriel Roubini
Chairman and Founder
Roubini Global Economics
China’s Unbalanced, Uncoordinated and Unsustainable Growth Model
I’m writing on the heels of two trips to China during which I met with senior policy makers, bank executives and academics, just as the government launched its 12th Five-Year Plan, intended to rebalance the long-term growth model. My meetings deepened my own impression and RGE’s long-standing house view of a potentially destabilizing contradiction between short- and medium-term economic performance: The economy is overheating here and now, but I’m convinced that in the medium term China’s overinvestment will prove deflationary both domestically and globally. Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible—most likely after 2013—China is poised for a sharp slowdown.
Continuing down the investment-led growth path will exacerbate the visible glut of capacity in manufacturing, real estate and infrastructure. I think this dichotomy between the high-growth/inflation pressures of the next couple of years and growth hitting a brick wall in the second half of the quinquennium is far more important than the current focus on a “soft landing” amid double-digit growth. A number of local scholars close to policy circles agree that this is the biggest challenge of the next few years, as we’ve been saying for months.
• Despite policy rhetoric about raising the consumption share in GDP, the path of least resistance is the status quo. The details of the new plan reveal continued reliance on investment, including public housing, to support growth, rather than a tax overhaul, substantial fiscal transfers, liberalization of the household registration system or an easing of financial repression.
• No country can be productive enough to take 50% of GDP and reinvest it into new capital stock without eventually facing massive overcapacity and a staggering nonperforming loan problem. Most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. China needs to save less, reduce fixed investment, cut net exports as a share of GDP and boost consumption as a share of GDP.
• China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure and property. To a visitor, this is evident in brand-new empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, massive new government buildings, ghost towns and brand new aluminum smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.
• It will take two decades of reforms to change the incentive to overinvest. Traditional explanations of the high savings rate (lack of a social safety net, limited public services, aging of the population, underdevelopment of consumer finance, etc.) are only part of the puzzle—the rest is the household sector’s sub-50% share of GDP.
• Several Chinese policies have led to a massive transfer of income from politically weak households to the politically powerful corporates: a weak currency makes imports expensive, low interest rates on deposits and low lending rates for corporates and developers amount to a tax on savings and labor repression has caused wages to grow much less than productivity.
• To ease this repression of household income, China would need a more rapid appreciation of the exchange rate, a liberalization of interest rates and a much sharper increase in wage growth. More importantly, China would need to privatize its state-owned enterprises so that their profits become income for households and/or massively tax SOEs’ profits and then transfer those fiscal resources to the household sector.
These are my observations and interpretations from the ground; for a selection of our relevant research, please see: China’s Banking Sector: The Big Payback, 'Chindia': Putting the Emerging Market Giants Into Perspective, What Happens When China’s Demographic Dividend Stops Paying Out?, Chinese Investment: The Slow Grind Ahead and Savers v. Spenders: Balancing the Global Recovery.
Nouriel Roubini Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 1:04 AM
作者：八袋长老 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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 [伪原创]者名经济学家的一封信：我看中国， -- 八袋长老 - (4940 Byte) 2011-4-08 周五, 14:53 (3526 reads)
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