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 向对巴菲特开展道德大批判的网友们推荐:高盛何以如此强硬：拒绝庭外和解 SEC缺有力证据 |
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not_a_CTA
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作者：not_a_CTA 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
高盛何以如此强硬：拒绝庭外和解 SEC缺有力证据
2010年05月12日01:15
美国当地时间5月10日,正处于风口浪尖上的高盛召开年度股东大会。在会上,高盛的CFO公开表示,高盛极有可能不会像外界所猜测的那样,与美国证券交易委员会（SEC）庭外和解,而是有可能会将案件进行下去。
这是迄今为止高盛就SEC起诉案最为明确的表态。事实上,高盛之所以如此强硬,并非事出无因。
记者采访的众多专业人士都指出,到目前为止,SEC所指控的高盛的罪名——“欺诈客户”,证据还很薄弱。
首先,在高盛为保尔森基金所设计的“算盘”复合CDO中,所有的参与方都是机构投资者。也就是说,所有的投资者都不是大街上的“孤儿寡母”,算不清楚这个“算盘”的价值,有被高盛或者保尔森基金轻而易举“诓”进去的可能性。
在已经透露出来的案件剧情中,保尔森基金所做对手盘的公司是ACA。事实上,ACA是业内非常专业的公司,而德国的IKB银行也是CDO市场上的大买家。“反而是保尔森基金,当时在CDO市场谁也没有听说过这个名字。”一位专业CDO交易员这样告诉记者。
第二,谁都知道这样的合约是一个“赌盘”。金融市场大部分都是零和游戏——输者用脚投票,而赢家获得投资收益。对赌的结果并非是零,增加的是整体的金融市场的效率。而参赌的人,都知道市场有两种结果——在这一场对赌中,德国IKB银行与ACA赌的是美国房地产市场会继续上升,而保尔森赌的是房地产泡沫会破裂。
保尔森基金也并不是看空美国房地产的开创先河者。“很早之前就有公司看空RMBS和CDO市场,只是他们死得很惨。所以,当时保尔森看空,不少人是笑话他们的。”上述CDO产品交易员说。
ACA前总裁曾承认,他们知道保尔森基金参与挑选那些RMBS产品,是有心看空这些产品的价值。保尔森也在一封给投资人的信中说,他们看空RMBS市场一直都是公开的,不存在意图欺诈对手的可能性。SEC没有控告保尔森基金,而是控告高盛,也是一个侧面证据。
从这一点上说,如果保尔森基金没有因为欺诈被SEC控告,高盛作为一个做市商,就更相信自己不应该成为被告方。“不能透露客户的部位”本身就是投行界所坚守的原则。
换句话说,如果双方都清楚彼此的立场,那么双方直接交易就可以了,保尔森基金完全可以省下付给高盛的1500万美元交易费用。这也就是为什么华尔街上大部分的投行支持高盛的原因:华尔街投资银行的“做市商”业务就是靠撮合交易双方来赚钱的。
第三,金融市场的老牌投行们都知道,最赚钱的生意是开赌场,而不是下场去赌。不管你交易策略有多高明,长期来看,能够维持51∶49赢率的公司都是少而又少的。
在日常交易中,当投资银行正在做空某笔产品,而交易员接到客户的电话要求做对手盘时,他们往往就是在对赌。这种情况下,高盛“做空”某项产品,很可能是客户巴不得的——他们可能正想“做多”。交易双方可以靠比拼对大势的精准分析,来赚到利润。
情形也有可能完全相反,某个对冲基金会要求与投资银行作对手盘,看空某项产品,而投资银行手上正持有这个产品的仓位。这种情形下,投资银行所做的就是为客户寻找交易方向相反的交易对手。
高盛的CEO曾经透露,这样的交易高盛每天都要进行上万笔。而“狡猾”的投资银行家们,大部分时间只是赚取当中最没有风险、最有保障的“手续费”。
客观的说,根据或然率,如果全是高盛与客户对赌,也许高盛早就没能活到今天。
第四,记者采访的几位证券业律师指出,SEC在起诉高盛时,选用的是民事诉讼,而不是要求美国司法部一起加入来进行刑事诉讼,这本身就是一个迹象。
刑事诉讼会要求SEC有更严格的举证责任。严格的举证责任是SEC退而求其次只追求民事诉讼的一个重要原因。而据美国媒体报道,在SEC最高的5人委员会做决定时,民主党派的3位委员通过,2名共和党委员反对。这也是SEC首次在未全票通过的情况下,对一家公司进行诉讼。
如果SEC手上的证据过硬,就会像麦道夫案那样,直接提出刑事诉讼。极端情况下,FBI的探员都有可能出动。
【作者：王康 来源：21世纪经济报道】
Paolo Pellegrini: Duh, of Course ACA Knew We Were Planning to Short Abacus
4/21/10
One of the key components of the SEC's case against Goldman Sachs is whether ACA, the independent bond insurer the firm hired to select securities for the collateralized debt obligation known as Abacus, knew that Paulson was planning to take a short position in the deal. ACA, which went bankrupt in 2007 after writing $68 billion in insurance on crappy mortage bonds, claims they didn't know, a charge the government reiterates in its floridly worded complaint against Goldman Sachs. "Unbeknownst to ACA at the time," it reads, "Paulson intended to effectively short the RMBS portfolio it helped select."
But this morning, CNBC's Steve Liesman unearthed a transc<x>ript from a deposition the government took from Paulson deputy Paolo Pelligrini, in which the noted jazz lover pooh-poohs the idea that ACA was left in the dark.
If ACA CDO manager Laura Schwartz didn't know they were planning to take a short position in Abacus, he said, then she was just dim.
"Did you tell her that you were interested in taking a short position in Abacus?" a government official asked Pellegrini, referring to the name of the CDO portfolio.
"Yes, that was the purpose of the meeting," Pellegrini responded.
Later in the deposition, Pellegrini he doesn't recall specifically telling her, but noted that he had walked her through the methodology Paulson and Co. had used to select the subprime securities they chose, he said, and made it clear that what they were looking for low FICO scores and high loan-to-value ratios. It would "have been a little difficult to sort of miss the fact that we were trying to short this stuff," he said. Asked why this rather important information, which basically undercuts the government's case, was missing and in fact directly contradicted in the complaint, a spokesman for the SEC said merely, "We look forward to presenting a complete and accurate evidentiary record in court."
The Paulson letter
Felix Salmon
Both the WSJ and the FT have got their hands on a letter from John Paulson to his investors, but infuriatingly neither of them have seen fit to share it with their readers. So we’re left with a few snippets of direct quotes, and we have to simply guess at the overall tone of the note.
Here’s the WSJ:
Mr. Paulson sent a letter to investors Tuesday night saying that in 2007 his firm wasn’t seen as an experienced mortgage investor, and that “many of the most sophisticated investors in the world” were “more than willing to bet against us.”
And here’s the FT:
“Paulson was transparent and open regarding its concerns about the mortgage market which were driven by analysis of publicly available data,” the letter states…
In his letter, Mr Paulson took pains to cite the SEC complaint that states that while he suggested 123 securities to be included in Abacus, ACA, the firm that acted as collateral manager and chose the mortgage securities to be included, ultimately accepted 55 and rejected 68. “All our dealings were through arm’s length transactions with experienced counterparties who had opposing views,” the letter adds.
Without seeing the actual letter, I’m going to have to conclude that it reads largely as a set of Goldman Sachs talking points, which is interesting: the fact that the SEC has charged Goldman but not Paulson gave Paulson an opportunity to try to distance himself from the alleged fraud. But instead he seems to be lining up with Goldman here — a stance which he might regret, if the SEC makes its fraud charges stick.
Once again, there seems to be a lot of hints and nudges in the direction that ACA knew that Paulson was short and willingly took the opposite side of his trade. Which sophisticated investors is Paulson talking about, who were more than willing to bet against him, if not ACA and IKB? Especially seeing as how the “transparent and open” Paulson had meetings with ACA in the run-up to the Abacus deal.
And once again we see the odd Goldman defense that ACA rejected a chunk of Paulson’s picks, with the unhelpful implication that if it hadn’t done so, then disclosure might have been warranted. At that point the question becomes just how many Paulson picks ACA needs to reject before you don’t need disclosure any more, and I don’t think that Goldman is going to like the answer to that question.
Paulson is now one of the largest hedge-fund managers in the world, largely because of all the people who piled into his funds after he made lots of money shorting mortgages. Those people aren’t particularly loyal to him: they haven’t been with him all that long. And if they think he’s starting to smell a little toxic, they’ll probably start looking for other places to put their money. Once upon a time, investors probably liked the fact that Paulson was so aggressive in his bets that he would do things like hire former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt, who then lobbied against proposed moves which would allow underwriters to modify mortgages and thereby help homeowners. Nowadays, however, that kind of activity is increasingly the kind of thing that investors want to disassociate themselves from.
So while I doubt Paulson will get a massive wave of redemption letters next Friday, I do think that his grip on his AUM is becoming increasingly tenuous. In turn, that might lead him to take a few more risks in an attempt to boost his returns and keep his investors that way.
作者：not_a_CTA 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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 向对巴菲特开展道德大批判的网友们推荐:高盛何以如此强硬：拒绝庭外和解 SEC缺有力证据 -- not_a_CTA - (7728 Byte) 2010-5-12 周三, 09:06 (2430 reads)
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